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Abstract 
 
With deep-seated gender imbalances prevalent in Bangladesh, it is compelling to understand 
how those women, who do manage to get employed, are faring in terms of equity. A popular 
approach involves analysing the gender wage gap across the entire distribution. With the 
assistance of data from QLFS 2016-17, the Mincerian model is estimated under various 
specifications, and then the final model decomposed using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method. Using these analyses at the mean as benchmarks, the entire distribution is examined 
by employing the conditional quantile regression model and Quantile Counterfactual 
Decomposition technique. The paper has then proceeded to posit the existence of a strong 
sticky floor effect and a weaker glass ceiling effect in Bangladesh, with discriminatory 
rewards to observed characteristics being the dominant feature of the observed wage gap 
across the entire distribution. Policy prescriptions and potential avenues for further scope 
concerning the paper are also mentioned in the end. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Gender inequalities within labour force participation and employment opportunities are both 
essentially two sides of the same coin. World Development Report (WDR) 2019 paints a dire 
picture globally: female employment rate for those aged above 15 years is close to half, 
whereas the same figure is three quarters for men. Women hold powerful positions in less 
than 20% of firms, and tend to be employed in low-productivity sectors and in jobs with 
limited on-the-job training scopes. 
 
Given such worrisome worldwide statistics, Bangladesh has been exemplary among South 
Asia countries for gender equality for three successive years, as measured by the Global 
Gender Gap Index (GGGI) 2017 (The Daily Star, 2017). However, one needs to carefully 
interpret these rankings: Bangladesh is topping the second-worst performing region and also 
evidently underperforming in the Economic Participation and Opportunity category (one of 
the subindexes the index itself is composed of). Despite a steady rise in the overall score over 
the years, the Economic Participation and Opportunity score had deteriorated after a peak in 
2013, only to pick up again recently.
1
 An in-depth investigation unveils more troublesome 
figures: female labour force participation rate (LFPR) stood at 36.3%, employment rate at 
33.9%, and share of females in high-status occupations at 10.4%, whereas the corresponding 
figures for their male counterparts were 80.5%, 78.0% and 89.6% respectively in 2016-17 
(BBS, 2018).  A disproportionate female representation is found in the contributing family 
helper category.
2
 Returns to work experience for females is about 50% of that of males—a 
mere 0.8% (WDR 2019). 
 
With such deep-seated gender imbalances, it is of great interest to know how those women, 
who do manage to get employed, are faring in terms of equity. A popular approach to this 
involves analysing the gender wage gap across the entire distribution. One related concept is 
the 'glass ceiling', which refers to the phenomenon whereby there exists a wider gender wage 
gap at the top of the wage distribution and an underrepresentation of females in well-paying 
occupations. Another related issue is the 'sticky floor', which refers to the situation where the 
pay gap is wider at the bottom, with women being trapped in those low-paid jobs.
3
 
 
South Asia, home to a population where 48.5% are women (WDI
4
, 2017), is unlikely to make 
sustainable progress disregarding women. Highlighting a contrast in performance with the 
neighbouring region is sufficient to convey the dismal scenario: while only South Asian 
country (Bangladesh) out of seven surpassed the GGGI global average score, the number is 
seven out of eleven for Southeast Asia, with one of them (Philippines) even making it to the 
top 10 in 2017.
5
 
                                                 
1
 See Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 in the Appendix. 
2
 See Figure 4 in the Appendix. 
3
 See Chi and Lee (2008) and Xiu and Gunderson (2014). 
4
 WDI stands for World Development Indicators. 
5
 See Figure 5 in the Appendix. 
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This paper proposes to investigate the existence of glass ceiling and sticky floor effects in the 
Bangladeshi context. There are two reasons for this: most South Asian countries have similar 
prevailing social norms and culture values when it comes to female upbringing or 
advancement, and, to our best knowledge, there exists no econometric work focusing 
exclusively on these two issues in the case of Bangladesh. By examining the case at hand 
successfully, the model can be replicated for the others countries as well in the future. 
 
Thus, with the assistance of data from Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2016-17 and 
appropriate methodology, we approach the problem and, in the end, analyse the findings and 
make conclusions and recommendations based upon them. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the importance of 
gender equity and the Bangladeshi scenario concerning it; Section 3 examines the existing 
relevant literature and posits the research objective in the end; Section 4 deals with the data 
and methodology used to establish this paper; in Section 5, the empirical analysis is presented 
and the last portion, Section 6, comprises of the concluding remarks, policy suggestions and 
future scopes for the study. 
 
2. Overview 
 
WDR 2012 had emphasized on the dual nature of relationship between gender parity and 
development. While the first linkage is rather obvious, the reverse one from gender equality 
towards development posited two arguments: not only is gender equality a moral objective in 
itself but also a major driver of efficiency and other development goals. The latter can be 
further divided into three broad mechanisms: greater productivity gains, better development 
outcomes for the immediate generation, and considerably representative institutions. 
 
Mahmud and Bidisha (2018) remarked on the prevailing low female LFPR in Bangladesh, 
with women getting stuck in a narrow range of low-pay work with less working hours. 
Improvements in human capital and other factors have failed to deliver desired results, 
suggesting a supply-driven growth in participation instead of demand-driven. 
 
Under Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3 of “Promote Gender Equality and Empower 
Women”, Bangladesh had successfully achieved Target 3.A.6 However; it has drastically 
lagged behind in the following indicators’ targets in 2015: 3.1c, 3.2 and 3.3.7 In particular, 
Indicator 3.2—a key measure of decent work and female empowerment—stood at 26.9% in 
2016-17, a sharp decline from 31.6% in 2013 and well below the target of 50% (GED, 2016; 
                                                 
6
 Target 3A was specified as “Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 
2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015” (GED, 2016). 
7
 Indicators 3.1c, 3.2 and 3.3 were specified as “Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education (Gender Parity Index 
= Girls/ Boys)”, “Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (%)” and “Proportion of 
seats held by women in national parliament (%)” respectively (GED, 2016). 
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BBS, 2018). Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5, under the banner of “Achieve gender 
equality and empower all women and girls”, covers a more holistic set of targets, and it is 
incumbent upon Bangladesh to overcome any challenges in achieving those by 2030. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
The importance of examining both upper and lower tails of the wage distribution had been 
highlighted by many, with Bjerk (2008) placing more importance on sticky floors for the 
lackluster representation of women at the higher end of managerial jobs. The paper in 
question will draw heavily on the methodologies of the below papers, albeit not rigidly due to 
data limitations. 
 
On a global scale, Fang and Sakellariou (2015) demonstrated that the glass ceiling is more of 
a developed and transition economies’ problem, and the rest of the world either suffers from 
the sticky floor or a blend of the two. What is more, the sticky floor is peculiar to Asia 
universally. Bain and Cummings (2000) and Jalalzai (2008) examined the special cases of 
glass ceiling in academic professions and executive positions respectively. There exists a 
sizeable literature in the context of developed economies and economies in transition, 
analysing either or both of these effects by employing versatile methodologies. In Europe, 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) found glass ceiling to be more common than sticky floor, and 
Christofides et al. (2013) observed substantial glass ceiling in ‘better’ occupations. Some 
other works include: Kee (2006) on Australia; Baert et al. (2016) on Belgium; Yap and 
Konrad (2009), Pendakur and Woodcock (2010), and Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) on 
Canada; Smith et al. (2011) on Denmark; Jellal et al. (2008) on France; Van Der Velde et al. 
(2013) on Poland; Atencio and Posadas (2015) on Russia; De la Rica et al. (2008) on Spain; 
Albrecht et al. (2008) on Sweden; Booth et al. (2003) on the UK; Bass and Avolio (1994), 
Cotter et al. (2001), Miller (2009), Smith (2012), Richey and Tromp (2016), and Blau and 
Kahn (2017) on the US. In contrast, there appears to be a dearth for developing economies: 
Chi and Li (2008), and Xiu and Gunderson (2014) on China; Hejase and Dah (2014), Hejase 
et al. (2014), and Hejase et al. (2015) on Lebanon; Tromp (2016) on South Korea; 
Adireksombat et al. (2010) and Fang and Sakellariou (2011) on Thailand, to name a few. 
 
With respect to Asia, a qualitative study by Yukongdi and Benson (2005) focusing on 
managerial glass ceiling exists. For South Asia, Ranjan (2015) conducted a qualitative 
examination of glass ceiling in foreign policy. In India, Agrawal (2013) had found evidence 
of glass ceiling for pooled and rural samples, and of sticky floor for urban sample; Khanna 
(2012) identified the case of sticky floors for the period of 2009-10, and Duraisamy and 
Duraisamy (2016) later corroborated the same phenomenon for all labour market segments 
for the period of 1983-2012. For Pakistan, Channar (2010) using primary data remarked that 
women were at a disadvantage compared to men for majority of earning groups, and were 
subject to prejudice from both bosses and colleagues alike. The works by Hyder and Reilly 
(2005) and Sabir and Aftab (2007) both nullify the case for glass ceiling in Pakistan, but 
Ahmed and Hyder (2008) found presence of both effects in 2005-06, with the gap increasing 
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at the lower tail. The latter also scrutinised occupational segregation using Duncan 
Dissimilarity Index (D-Index) and found education as being the major driver. Gunewardena 
et al. (2008) demonstrated sticky floors and negligible glass ceilings in both Sri Lankan 
public and private sectors for the period 1996-2004. 
 
There have been some notable Bangladeshi studies concerning the gender wage gap. 
Zafarullah (2000) undertook a qualitative study of glass ceiling in public administration using 
primary data. Kapsos (2008) using Bangladesh Occupational Wage Dataset found the average 
woman earns 23.1% less per hour than her male counterpart, after fully controlling for 
covariates. Ahmed and Maitra (2010) conducted decomposition at the mean using 1999–2000 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and also addressed the issue of selectivity bias. Their results 
suggested higher pay gaps for urban workers than rural ones, and emphasized on the 
significance of discrimination on the said gaps. Ahmed and McGillivray (2015) considered 
the time period of 1999–2009 and employed three decomposition techniques to demonstrate 
greater wage gaps at the bottom of the distribution. They further mentioned gender disparity 
in access to education hinders the access to high-pay work. Decomposing unconditional 
quantile regressions for 2005–2009, Ahmed and Maitra (2015) remarked on the presence of 
sticky floor effect and the salience of gender discrimination. Both of these studies took into 
account sample selection, with the latter detecting an understatement of the gap otherwise. 
Based on LFS 2005-06, Anjum (2016) employed a variety of decomposition methods and 
also demonstrated smaller gender gap in earnings in the public sector than the private. 
Siddiquee and Hossain (2018) decomposes wages for the urban workers using LFS 2010 
dataset and observed bigger wage differences in the lower tail. Rahman and Al-Hasan (2018) 
corroborated the former phenomenon for all workers using QLFS 2015-2016, and added 
evidence on the role of informal employment for the large gaps in the lower quantiles. 
 
Finding no empirical investigation focusing solely on the glass ceiling and sticky floor 
phenomena in Bangladesh, our research objective is to evaluate this caveat in literature. In 
particular, our research question stands as follows. Do glass ceiling and/or sticky floor effects 
exist in Bangladesh? If so, then to which degree and what are the factors affecting them, 
along with their relative importance? 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1. Data Description 
 
This study uses the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2016-2017 of Bangladesh, a 
nationally representative cross-sectional random sample, conducted by the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS). The sample uses information on both individual and household 
level characteristics contained in the dataset. 
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The total number of observations for the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2016-2017 
was 493,886. Total number of households was 123,000. As it is a rotating panel, the annual 
weight provided by BBS for the data is used. 
 
Our selected sample for analysis is restricted to those in wage-employment who are aged 15 
or older and holding only a primary job, aggregating to 70, 035 observations, of which 
73.73% are male. 
 
4.2. The Empirical Model 
 
The Mincerian Regression is estimated under five different specifications, followed by 
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition (OBD) on the final model. Understanding the fact that the 
wage gap may be underestimated due to sample selection problem (Ahmed and Maitra, 
2015), Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) will be employed to correct it. This is because only 
earnings information for those who are working is available, as well as participation into 
wage employment may not be random. 
 
Afterwards, quantile regressions (QRs) and Quantile Counterfactual Decompositions (QCD) 
are performed to get an elaborate understanding of the scenario along the entire wage 
distribution. 
 
We mainly focus on the existing literature regarding Bangladesh while choosing the 
variables, to ensure both appropriateness and data availability. Since these works were based 
on existing international literature, scholarly validity is ensured. 
 
For the dependent variable, which is the natural log of monthly wages of those aged 15 and 
above in wage-employment holding only a primary job, we have excluded child labour, the 
self-employed, unpaid family workers (referred to as contributing family members in the 
dataset), and those still studying (Ahmed and Maitra, 2015; Rahman and Islam, 2013; 
Atencio and Posadas, 2015).
8
 Although the self-employed consist of a majority of the 
employed in 2016-17 (47.79%), their earnings are unlikely to be comparable (Atencio and 
Posadas, 2015). We take the natural log of wages since it enables us to calculate percentage 
wage gaps (Rahman and Al-Hasan, 2018). Monthly wages are taken into account instead of 
hourly; otherwise it might be misleading as females in general work fewer hours per week 
compared to men in the sample. Moreover, the periodicity of payment is usually monthly and 
the proportion of day labourers is also lower in the selected sample.
9
 Furthermore, Rahman 
and Al-Hasan (2018) point out working hours are unimportant in the Bangladeshi context as 
payments are usually made on a monthly basis. Hereafter, we shall refer to this selected 
sample of workers as wage employees in this paper. 
                                                 
8
 The official retirement age in Bangladesh is 59 years (60 years for freedom fighters) but this is only applicable 
for the public sector, whereas the bulk of our sample is employed in the private sector (Bdnews24.com, 2018). 
Hence we impose no age ceiling. 
9
 See Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the Appendix. 
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Explanatory variables for the probit regression for participation have been categorized into 
five major groups: (i) Personal Characteristics; (ii) Region of Residence; (iii) Household 
Circumstances; (iv) Household Head Characteristics and (v) Household Socioeconomic 
Status.
10
 
 
Observed characteristics for the Mincerian regression model can be subsumed into three 
major groups: (i) Personal Characteristics; (ii) Region of Residence and (iii) Occupation, 
Sector of Work and Economic Activity.
11
 We elaborate on these three groups in Table 1. 
 
4.2.1. Mincerian Regression 
 
The augmented Mincerian model stands as follows (Siddiquee and Hossain, 2018; Jellal et 
al., 2008): 
 
         
      
 
where wi is the log monthly earnings of the ith individual in wage employment holding only a 
primary job,  fi is a gender dummy, xi is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i  
except gender, α measures the intercept shift due to gender differences, β represents the 
vector of slope coefficients and intercept, and εi is the error term. 
 
The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is estimated for participation into the selected sample using 
Heckman Two-Step (Heckit) in order to deal with selection bias and the resulting biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Heckman, 1976). The first stage involves calculating the IMR from a 
probit regression for participation that is estimated for the entire sample of working-age 
population
12
, and in the second stage, it is included in the augmented Mincerian model to 
correct for sample bias. 
 
4.2.2. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
 
A popular technique in the gender wage gap literature to examine group differences at the 
mean is the Oaxaca-Blinder counterfactual decomposition (OBD) method for linear 
regressions. The results are utilized as a yardstick for comparison of the wage gap across the 
distribution (Ahmed and Maitra, 2015), and also to point out the merits of QCD. 
 
Rewriting the above linear model with slight modifications as (Jann, 2008): 
 
     
                              
                                                 
10
 See Mahmud and Bidisha (2018) and Rahman and Islam (2013). 
11
 See Siddiquee and Hossain (2018) and Ahmed and Maitra (2015). 
12
 Working-age population is defined here as those aged 15 and older, i.e. above the legal working age (BBS, 
2018). 
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The following two-fold decomposition model is obtained, using the ‘pooled’ option in Stata, 
as suggested by Jann (2008): 
 
                          
        
      
           
       
 
where the first term on the right-hand side gives the explained effect and the second term 
gives the unexplained effect.  The explained effect (also called the “quantity effect”) refers to 
the portion of gender wage differential owing to the differences in covariates or predictors. 
On the other hand, the unexplained effect is generally referred to as discrimination, albeit it 
may contain differences due to the impact of potential unobserved covariates. 
 
4.2.3. Quantile Regression 
 
In order to study the glass ceiling and sticky floor effects in Bangladesh, it is necessary to 
look at wage differences at various points over the whole wage distribution, not just at the 
mean. It involves the specification of wage categories (or “quantiles”) by replacing observed 
wage differentials with the distribution of the error obtained from the Mincerian regression.  
 
Regarding the suitability of quantile regression (QR) for the purpose of this study, there are 
four reasons. Firstly, they provide more robust estimates than OLS in the presence of non-
normal or heteroskedastic errors and outliers. Secondly, whenever the subpopulation of 
interest is not limited to the mean of the dependent variable, it enables study of the impact 
and significance of any covariate over the entire distribution instead. Thirdly, QR is 
insensitive to monotonic transformations of the like of log(.), so we can always reverse our 
results to the original form. Lastly, truncated regressions run on the stratified unconditional 
distribution of the dependent variable as an alternative would have resulted in smaller sample 
sizes and severe sample selection bias.
13
 
 
Thus, the conditional QR model stands as follows, assuming a linear specification (Jellal et 
al., 2008): 
                   
      
 
where wi is the log monthly earnings of the ith individual holding only a primary job, fi is a 
gender dummy, xi is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i except gender, and qθ 
is the θth conditional quantile of wi.. As per Koenker and Bassett (1978), the error distribution 
is not specified for such a model. 
 
The model is applied only for the final augmented Mincerian model to the following 
quantiles: θ=0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80 and 0.90. Given the relatively large 
size of the sample, bootstrapping is not pursued. 
                                                 
13
 See Jellal et al. (2008), Baum (2013) and Lê Cook and Manning (2013). 
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4.2.4. Quantile Decomposition 
 
Quantile Counterfactual Decomposition (QCD) over the whole distribution enables us to 
decipher if the proportion of discrimination is larger than the explained part for all females, or 
only certain subgroups, and if so, on whom the impact is the greatest. Conventional OBDs at 
the mean cannot answer these.
14
 
 
To decompose the wage gaps at different quantiles instead of just at the mean, the QCD 
approach suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) is followed using the statistical tools 
developed by Chernozhukov et al. (2013).  
 
The decomposition model stands as follows: 
 
                                                                     
 
where the first term on the right-hand side gives the characteristics effect (composition effect) 
and the second term gives the coefficients effect (or wage structure effect). The 
characteristics effect corresponds to the explained part of the OBD, whereas the coefficients 
effect refers to the unexplained part. Here, qw(m|f) is the counterfactual wage distribution that 
females would earn if remunerated according to the male wage structure (Blau and Kahn, 
2017), 
 
100 equations per quantile are estimated. Once again, given the large size of the sample and 
the excessive time commitment involved, we do not resort to bootstrapping for standard 
errors. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis  
 
All Figures and Tables are presented in the Appendix. Figure 9 depicts the distribution of the 
natural log of monthly wages for males and females. The male distribution is left-skewed 
compared to the female one, with three distinctive surpassing peaks for males and a small one 
for females nearby the upper tail. Table 2 reveals that the wage gap is in general present 
throughout the entire distribution; however, it is important to note that these are the 
unadjusted gaps and does not account for the gaps between male and female workers 
possessing approximately homogenous observable characteristics, leading to overstating or 
understating the degree of discrimination if women are systematically less or more qualified 
than men respectively (Majchrowska et al., 2014). 
 
                                                 
14
 See Atencio and Posadas (2015). 
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Noticeable differences are not only restricted to wages between males and females but also 
present in the averages of observable characteristics. Table 3 provides the descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample of working-age population while Table 4 provides for the 
selected sample of wage employees. The Adjusted Wald Test is also performed for the 
differences, since the conventional t-test cannot be performed over survey data. 
 
Table 3 reveals that around 30% men and 10% women are engaged in wage employment, and 
the difference is highly statistically significant. This goes on to show the extensive gender 
disparity in both participation and employment rates for wage employment. Women are on 
average younger than men in 2016-2017, demonstrating both the low levels of participation 
of older women and greater ease of access to employment for their successors.
15
 
Educationally, women again fall short of men, except for primary and secondary levels, with 
men clearly dominating the higher educational levels. All the differences are highly 
statistically significant too. More males are single in comparison to females proportionately, 
whereas the reverse is true in case of other marital statuses. Greater proportion of females is 
concentrated in the urban region compared to men, albeit the difference is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, majority of the sample resides in rural areas. 
 
Table 4 reports that the average monthly wage is lower for women by 12.40%, and the 
difference of BDT 1,495.24 is highly statistically significant. Women are also younger in the 
selected sample. In terms of educational levels, they are behind men at all levels with 
significant differences at the 1% level, except for the primary and secondary levels where 
differences are significant at the 10% level and insignificant respectively. However, a higher 
percentage of women have received vocational training compared to men, and the difference 
is highly significant. Around 75% of wage employees are married. Proportionately, more 
men are single and married than women, while the opposite holds true for widowed and 
divorced/separated. All the differences are highly significant in the marital status category. 
Majority of the selected sample is concentrated in the rural regions (around 60%). 
Divisionally, a greater percentage of women can be found in Chittagong and Dhaka. All the 
differences across the various occupations are highly significant, and women perform better 
only in case of professionals, craft related trades workers and elementary occupations. 
Around 91% of the selected sample is further observed to be employed in the private sector. 
Men are found to be dominating the jobs in the agriculture and construction sectors, and 
women in the manufacturing and service sectors. However, the gender difference is 
insignificant in the manufacturing sector. Lastly, a higher percentage of females are 
employed in jobs with a written contract in place. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 See Siddiquee and Hossain (2018). 
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5.2. Econometrics Analysis 
 
5.2.1. Results from Mincerian Regression  
 
Table 5 displays the OLS results from the Mincerian model for various specifications, where 
Model (1) reports the unadjusted wage gap. Thereafter, subsequent sets of explanatory 
variables are added step by step so as to decipher their effects on the gap. 
 
From Model (1), the raw or unadjusted wage gap in Bangladesh for wage employees stands at 
12.29%, or 13.08% to be exact
16
. Accounting for all factors, the gender wage gap stands at 
11.4%, or 12.09% to be exact, in the final specification. Thus controlling for all factors only 
causes a slight drop in the rate. It is worth noting that the only substantial fall in wage gap 
occurs after controlling for education and training, which is consistent with our descriptive 
findings where the majority of women had little or no education. Educational attainment and 
vocational training thus explains the gender wage gap to a large extent. However, in the final 
model, the “Others” educational category and training become insignificant. Moreover, 
vocational training is also found to have a negative effect there. While highly significant 
positive impacts are associated with residing in urban regions and holding a job with a 
written contract, being employed in the private sector renders a highly significant negative 
effect on wages. The overall R
2
 value is 65.55% for Model (5), suggesting moderately good 
explanatory power of the model. 
 
From the probit regression for participation in wage employment, the calculated IMR of (-
0.0131) is insignificant, with a standard error of 0.0081, in the final model. Therefore, 
concluding the absence of selection bias in the sample, the IMR is not included in any further 
regressions or decompositions.
17
 
 
5.2.2. Results from Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition  
 
Table 6 presents the results of the OBD, which will serve as the benchmark for comparison 
against the QCD results. Robust estimates are ensured with survey estimation technique. 
 
A statistically significant difference of 0.1255 log points is found between the log of monthly 
wages for males and females at the mean.  The explained portion outlines the average rise in 
women’s wage if they had shared the same characteristics as men. The insignificant 
increment of 0.0094 log points implies that differences in endowments account for a mere 
7.49% of the gender wage gap. The unexplained component measures the change in women’s 
wages upon the exertion of men’s coefficients to the women’s characteristics. 
 
                                                 
16
 Exact Gap=[(exp(0.1229)-1)*100], see Siddiquee and Hossain (2018). 
17
 See Rahman and Al-Hasan (2018). 
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Retransforming the results to the original scale (Bangladeshi Taka) from the logarithmic 
scale, the geometric means of wages for men and women are BDT 11,680.46 and BDT 
10,302.56 respectively. This leads to a gap of 13.37%, where adjusting women’s endowment 
levels to that of men’s would raise women’s wages by a negligible 0.94%, leaving 12.32% of 
the gap unexplained. 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reveals that the majority of the explained part of the outcome differential 
can be attributed to the differences in age, education, division and occupation. While training 
and marital status do not appear to be of much import, contributions of the remaining 
predictors, although significant, are of lesser magnitude.
18
 
 
5.2.3. Results from Quantile Regression  
 
Table 7 provides the results of the conditional QRs by assuming similar returns to included 
labour market characteristics for men and women
19
, and the coefficients differ from quantile 
to quantile. The adjusted wage gaps as measured by the female coefficients are highly 
significant across all the nine quantiles. Use of QR is justified as the coefficients differ 
substantially from the OLS coefficient in Model (5) of Table 5, including at the median. 
Moreover, equality of female coefficients across the specified quantiles has been tested using 
a simultaneous-quantile regression with 100 bootstrap replications. The paper soundly rejects 
the null hypothesis of coefficient equality at an estimated F(8,60942) value of 6.91.
20
 
 
Focusing only on the female coefficient, which measures the degree of unexplained gender 
wage gap after controlling for differences in individual characteristics (Jellal et al., 2008), the 
highest gender wage gaps are observed in the lower quantiles, Q10, Q20 and Q30. Women’s 
earnings are lower than men’s by 14.27% in the first quantile. The lowest wag gap is reported 
in the sixth decile, which is 10.22%. The adjusted wage gap is higher than the raw wage gap 
(from Table 2) at Q20, Q30, Q60 and Q90, indicating that women should earn more than men 
at those deciles, if only their productive characteristics are taken into account.
21
 
 
Figure 10 depicts a graphical comparison between the QR coefficients and the OLS 
coefficient for female. A distinct inverted-U shape can be seen for the QR ones till Q80, 
implying larger gaps at the lower and upper end of the wage distribution. At Q90, the wage 
gap reduces slightly, but it is still higher than both the median and mean levels. The wage gap 
is lower at the fifth, sixth and seventh deciles in comparison to the OLS, which is estimated at 
the mean. At the lowermost and uppermost quantiles, the gap is higher than the OLS by 
2.86% and 0.71% respectively. Except for Q10, Q20, Q30 and Q60, the results do not appear 
to differ much statistically from OLS. The Pseudo-R
2
 value for the various quantiles ranges 
from 0.2597 to 0.4938, suggesting the model is a very good fit for the data. 
                                                 
18
 See Jann (2008). 
19
 See Jellal et al. (2008). 
20
 See Siddiquee and Hossain (2018). 
21
 See Van Der Velde et al. (2013). 
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5.2.4. Results from Quantile Decomposition   
 
The assumption of identical returns to characteristics for males and females at the various 
quantiles for the pooled sample in the previous section is a priori impractical, and thereby it 
makes sense to carry out decomposition at the quantiles rather than simply at the mean.
22
 
 
Table 8 reports the QCD results. In comparison to the middle and top portions of the 
distribution, estimated total wag gap is largest at the bottom. The gap ranges from 7.76% to 
17.64% across the distribution, with the difference being lower at Q90 compared to anywhere 
else. Along the entire wage distribution, majority of the gap can be attributed to 
discrimination, ranging from 67.92% at Q80 to 112.33% at Q20. This goes on to indicate 
extensive wage discrimination against women in Bangladesh, especially for those belonging 
to the bottom half of the distribution. 
 
Focusing on the proportionate contribution of different productive characteristics towards the 
gender wage gap, differences in endowment levels are in favour of men at the upper tail. 
Contributing negatively at the lower end by (-6.4%), it constitutes to 18.07% between high-
income men and women, stressing the pertinence of the characteristics effect at the upper tail. 
The negative composition effect till the median suggests the presence of more overqualified 
women than men for the bottom half of the distribution; for instance, if women shared similar 
characteristics as men, ceteris paribus, the gender wage gap would have been higher by 
1.46% at Q20 (Atencio and Posadas, 2015). Thus in the bottom half, the better endowment 
levels of women should have resulted in a smaller pay gap. In addition, the positive and 
substantial wage structure effect makes the case for severe gender discrimination at this 
end.
23
 
 
Figure 11 depicts QCD results against OBD. The gap is observed to fluctuate across the 
distribution, and is higher than the result obtained with the mean for the first and seventh 
deciles. Moreover, although discrimination accounts for the majority of the gap everywhere, 
gender differences in labour market characteristics are evidently more relevant for the upper 
tail. 
 
Overall, following the lines of reasoning provided by Chi and Lee (2008) and Xiu and 
Gunderson (2014), the paper affirms the presence of a strong “sticky floor” effect and a 
weaker “glass ceiling” effect in Bangladesh, due to larger observed gaps in the bottom tail 
than the upper. The findings are consistent with Ahmed and Maitra (2015). The strong sticky 
floor effect is manifested in terms of both the raw and adjusted observed wage gaps, 
unexplained differences in returns to similar characteristics, and proportion of gap attributed 
to discrimination. Women at the bottom are subject to extensive discrimination despite being 
superior to men in terms of endowment. On the other hand, limited evidence of glass ceiling 
effect is exhibited in the same manner, especially at seventh and ninth deciles, although it is 
                                                 
22
 See Jellal et al. (2008). 
23
 See Majchrowska et al. (2014). 
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lesser at Q80. The hypothesis is mostly weakened both by the raw wage gap and the 
prevalence of greater pay gaps at the median than at Q90. Women face discrimination at the 
upper end chiefly due to differences in returns, and to a lesser extent, due to lower 
endowment levels of productive characteristics than men. 
 
6. Findings, Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
Using QLFS 2016-17, the study has found evidence of both unadjusted and adjusted gender 
wage gaps and variations in their magnitudes across the entire wage distribution. The paper 
has then proceeded to posit the existence of a strong sticky floor effect and a weaker glass 
ceiling effect in Bangladesh, with discriminatory rewards to observed characteristics being 
the dominant feature of the observed wage gap across the entire distribution. 
 
Addressing the underlying causes is crucial for the design of policies to tackle such gendered 
wage inequalities. Low-earning women require access to jobs which reward their skills as 
much as their male counterparts; the same holds true for the high-income group, except 
women there also need to be equipped with adequate labour market skills on a par with men. 
The private sector could be incentivised to offer apprenticeships and training to females.
24
 
Rahman and Al-Hasan (2018), having demonstrated that the gap at the bottom is essentially 
driven by informal employment, had suggested interventions towards greater ease of access 
to the formal labour market for women.
25
 For instance, mandatory inclusion of a 
nondiscrimination clause in recruitment improves female employment in formal sector by 
8.6% (WDR 2019). The driving factor for the gap being the unexplained portion will require 
a change in the mindset and/or social norms, possibly in the form of information campaigns 
and stringent laws. Gender sensitive educational materials are also needed.
26
 It is possible 
that women are more inclined towards less demanding jobs due to a lack of daycare facilities 
or to preserve family-work balance, since the traditional role of women at home are still 
greater in Bangladesh than their male counterparts. In turn, employers may show similar 
prejudices while making hiring or promotion decisions, by way of presuming less career 
commitment from female employees (Albrecht et al., 2003). This might be one explanation 
for the persistence of the strong sticky floor effect, which in turn boosts the glass ceiling 
effect from below. The government’s focus on gender parity in primary and secondary 
education has clearly had positive impact, but it is time to focus on higher levels of education 
which have higher returns attached with them, in order to enhance the human capital of 
women at the upper tail (Table 7).
27
 As noted by Gupta et al. (2008), undue exercise of 
family-friendly policies may also serve as backlash towards female career advancement. Xiu 
                                                 
24
 See Indrawati and Albrectsen (2018). 
25
 It is worth noting that the unregulated informal employment in Bangladesh constitutes 85.1% of those 
employed, and the figure stands at 91.8% and 82.1% for women and men respectively (BBS, 2018). 
26
 See Indrawati and Albrectsen (2018). 
27
 GED (2016) offers the following explanations for low female tertiary enrollment: poverty and hidden 
educational costs, gender-based violence, limited mobility, insufficient girls’ hostels, wage rise and labour 
market expansion. 
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and Gunderson (2014) further mention the influence of “old boy” networks in high-status 
positions as an impediment. 
 
So far, gender equality has been enshrined in the constitution (Article 19) and Bangladesh 
Labour (Amendment) Act (BLA) 2018 in terms of vague statements and plenty of loopholes 
on the enforcement end. Even the recently approved amendment to the BLA only has one 
female-friendly stipulation: the mandatory eight-week maternity leave. Although a 
commendable move, it is important to acknowledge these laws only pertain to the smaller 
formal sector of the country. As a result, the status quo as it is leaves a lot to be desired from 
the government. 
 
While acknowledging the case of unobservable variables such as mentality and social norms 
which form part of the unexplained gap, another severe limitation of the study is the lack of 
data capturing major relevant aspects such as transitions in employment status, promotions, 
firm-level data (policies, firm and industry growth etc) and so on. There is neither a large 
dataset of those in high-status occupation nor a panel dataset for examining the scenario over 
the years. Moreover, there is no standard questionnaire for labour force surveys 
internationally or even for South Asia, hampering the scope for comparison. In addition, 
gender differences in opportunity are not reflected in the adjusted wage gap (Gould et al., 
2016). 
 
Future scope regarding the study is extensive, but largely dependent on the availability of 
adequate quality datasets. Moreover, it is possible to examine the case for a number of 
periods using decomposition techniques based on unconditional quantile regression models as 
proposed by Fortin et al. (2011), which makes possible the calculation of partial effects. 
 
Bangladesh will deprive itself of $30 billion worth of annual GDP or an 8% rise above the 
usual by 2025 if gender inequality remains unaddressed.
28
 The genesis of the glass ceiling 
and sticky floor effects in Bangladesh is, all in all, a complex issue calling for investigation 
from multiple dimensions and immediate government attention, since there appears to be 
simply no room for complacency. 
 
  
                                                 
28
 See Indrawati and Albrectsen (2018). 
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Figure 1: South Asia's Performance in GGGI 2017 
 
Notes: Global Rankings (out of 144 countries) are mentioned before countries’ names. The dotted line 
represents the global weighted average score. Score was unavailable for Afghanistan. 
Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bangladesh's Performance in GGGI 2017 
 
Note: Rankings by Subindex (out of 144 countries) are mentioned before countries’ names. 
Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Bangladesh's Score in GGGI (2006-2017) 
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Employed People, by Status in Employment & Gender (%) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Report on LFS 2016-17, BBS (2018). 
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Figure 5: Southeast Asia's Performance in GGGI 2017 
 
 
Notes: Global Rankings (out of 144 countries) are mentioned before countries’ names. The dotted line 
represents the global weighted average score. 
Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum. 
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Figure 6: Working Hours per Week, by Gender (%) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from QLFS 2016-17, BBS. 
 
Figure 7: Employment Status (%) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from QLFS 2016-17, BBS. 
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Figure 8: Periodicity of Payment (%) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from QLFS 2016-17, BBS. 
 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of Natural Log of Monthly Wage by Gender 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from QLFS 2016-17, BBS. 
 
  
1.5 
57.74 
7.47 
33.29 
Others 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
0
.5
1
1
.5
D
en
si
ty
6 8 10 12 14
Natural Log of Monthly Wages
Male Female
Page | 27  
 
Figure 10: Results of Conditional QR 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
Figure 11: Results of QCD 
 
Note: QCD results differ from QR ones due to the incorporation of the counterfactual. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 1: Full List of Independent Variables 
Category Variables 
Personal Characteristics 
(i) Dummy for gender (1 if female, 0 if male) 
(ii) Age 
(iii) Square of age 
(iv) Seven educational qualification dummies (with no 
education being the base) 
(v) Dummy for vocational training (1 if any training received, 
0 if otherwise) 
(vi) Four dummies for marital status (with single being the 
base) 
Region of Residence 
(i) Dummy for urban (1 if urban, 0 if rural) 
(ii) Eight divisional dummies (with Dhaka as the base) 
Occupation, Sector of Work and 
Economic Activity 
(i) Ten occupational dummies (Armed Forces Occupations 
being the base)
a
 
(ii) Dummy for private sector (1 if private, 0 if otherwise) 
(iii) Four broad economic sector dummies (agriculture sector 
being the base)
b
 
(iv) Dummy for the type of work contract (1 if written, 0 if 
otherwise) 
 
Notes: 
a
 Jellal et al. (2008) points out that there is a lack of any definitive consensus regarding the inclusion of 
occupation and economic sector. Employer prejudice while hiring for certain occupations can be attributed to 
employer practices rather than personal choice or productivity dissimilarities. Excluding them may 
underestimate the significance of background and choice-based factors on earnings, whereas fully controlling 
for these might understate the importance of labour market constraints on earnings (Altonji and Blank, 1999). 
b
 Jellal et al. (2008) argue that sector of work is an endogenous factor to a degree since the decision is most 
likely made upon completion of education. 
 
Table 2: Natural Log of Monthly Wages and Gender Wage Gap over the Various 
Quantiles and the Mean 
Quantile Total Male Female Gender Wage Gap 
0.01 8.5172 8.6995 8.2940 0.4055 
0.05 8.7483 8.8247 8.5172 0.3075 
0.10 8.8537 8.8537 8.6995 0.1542 
0.20 8.9227 8.9872 8.8537 0.1335 
0.25 8.9872 8.9872 8.8537 0.1335 
0.30 8.9872 9.0360 8.9227 0.1133 
0.40 9.1050 9.1590 8.9872 0.1718 
0.50 9.2103 9.2103 9.1050 0.1053 
0.60 9.3057 9.3057 9.2103 0.0954 
0.70 9.4727 9.4727 9.3057 0.1670 
0.75 9.6158 9.6158 9.4727 0.1431 
0.80 9.6803 9.7410 9.6158 0.1252 
0.90 10.1266 10.1266 10.1266 0.0000 
0.95 10.3090 10.3090 10.2400 0.0690 
0.99 10.8396 10.9151 10.6454 0.2697 
Mean 9.3269 9.3581 9.2352 0.1229 
Note:  Gender wage gap calculated as the difference between the natural log of male wages and the natural log 
of female wages (Ahmed and Maitra, 2011). 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Working-Age Population 
Variable 
Full Sample Male Female Difference 
Adjusted Wald 
Test 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Wage –Employment (Only Primary Job) 0.2003 0.0028 0.3003 0.0038 0.1020 0.0029 0.1983*** 
Personal Characteristics 
Age:        
15-24 0. 2516 0.0016 0.2508 0.0020 0.2525 0.0020 -0.0018 
25-34 0.2391 0.0017 0.2176 0.0021 0.2602 0.0021 -0.0425*** 
35-44 0.1956 0.0013 0.1947 0.0018 0.1965 0.0017 -0.0018 
45-54 0.1447 0.0011 0.1474 0.0015 0.1421 0.0015 0.0053*** 
55-64 0.0963 0.0010 0.1047 0.0014 0.0881 0.0012 0.0165*** 
65-74 0.0517 0.0007 0.0607 0.0010 0.0430 0.0008 0.0177*** 
75+ 0.0208 0.0005 0.0242 0.0007 0.0175 0.0006 0.0067*** 
Educational Qualification:        
No Education 0.3059 0.0045 0.2793 0.0047 0.3321 0.0045 -0.0529*** 
Below Primary 0.0787 0.0022 0.0839 0.0024 0.0736 0.0022 0.0103*** 
Primary 0.2272 0.0022 0.2195 0.0026 0.2348 0.0023 -0.0153*** 
Secondary 0.1664 0.0018 0.1559 0.0020 0.1768 0.0022 -0.0209*** 
Higher Secondary 0.1705 0.0026 0.1888 0.0029 0.1526 0.0027 0.0362*** 
Tertiary 0.0473 0.0021 0.0663 0.0027 0.0286 0.0017 0.0377*** 
Others 0.0039 0.0004 0.0063 0.0007 0.0016 0.0002 0.0047*** 
Marital Status:        
Single 0.1916 0.0016 0.2657 0.0022 0.1186 0.0016 0.1471*** 
Married 0.7436 0.0019 0.7171 0.0022 0.7696 0.0022 -0.0524*** 
Widowed 0.0556 0.0008 0.0128 0.0004 0.0977 0.0014 -0.0849*** 
Separated/Divorced 0.0092 0.0003 0.0043 0.0003 0.0141 0.0006 -0.0097*** 
Household Head 0.3641 0.0014 0.6301 0.0029 0.1025 0.0022 0.5277*** 
Region of Residence 
Residence:        
Urban 0.2931 0.0059 0.2919 0.0061 0.2943 0.0059 -0.0024 
Rural 0.7069 0.0059 0.7081 0.0061 0.7057 0.0057 0.0024 
Division:        
Page | 30  
 
Variable 
Full Sample Male Female Difference 
Adjusted Wald 
Test 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Barisal 0.0544 0.0020 0.0537 0.0022 0.0551 0.0018 -0.0014* 
Chittagong 0.1761 0.0052 0.1668 0.0052 0.1851 0.0055 -0.0183*** 
Dhaka 0.2654 0.0093 0.2666 0.0095 0.2641 0.0093 0.0025 
Khulna 0.1145 0.0034 0.1155 0.0036 0.1136 0.0033 0.0019 
Rajshahi 0.1370 0.0030 0.1393 0.0033 0.1348 0.0029 0.0045*** 
Rongpur 0.1373 0.0052 0.1437 0.0056 0.1310 0.0049 0.0126*** 
Sylhet 0.0696 0.0020 0.0682 0.0021 0.0710 0.0022 -0.0028** 
Household Circumstances 
Presence of Young Children:        
No Children under 13 0.8073 0.0026 0.8158 0.0025 0.7990 0.0027 0.0168*** 
Number of Children Aged 0-5 0.4688 0.0050 0.4492 0.0050 0.4881 0.0052 -0.0389*** 
Number of Children Aged 6-12 0.6464 0.0061 0.6307 0.0064 0.6619 0.0062 -0.0312*** 
Number of Males Aged 65 or Higher 0.1495 0.0024 0.1599 0.0026 0.1392 0.0023 0.0208*** 
Number of Females Aged 65 or Higher 0.0994 0.0020 0.0792 0.0018 0.1192 0.0024 -0.0400*** 
Number of Earning Males 0.5807 0.0074 0.6431 0.0082 0.5192 0.0068 0.1240*** 
Number of Non-Earning Males 1.1050 0.0086 1.2470 0.0097 0.9652 0.0078 0.2819*** 
Household Head Characteristics 
Sex of Household Head:        
Male 0.9002 0.0027 0.9481 0.0022 0.8532 0.0033 0.0949*** 
Female 0.0998 0.0027 0.0520 0.0022 0.1469 0.0033 -0.0949*** 
Education of Household Head:        
No Education 0.3980 0.0062 0.4048 0.0064 0.3915 0.0061 0.0133*** 
Below Primary 0.0860 0.0028 0.0871 0.0029 0.0849 0.0027 0.0022*** 
Primary 0.2055 0.0030 0.2028 0.0031 0.2082 0.0030 -0.0054*** 
Secondary 0.1187 0.0022 0.1159 0.0023 0.1214 0.0022 -0.0056*** 
Higher Secondary 0.1280 0.0028 0.1261 0.0029 0.1298 0.0028 -0.0037*** 
Tertiary 0.0610 0.0031 0.0606 0.0030 0.0613 0.0032 -0.0007 
Others 0.0031 0.0005 0.0030 0.0005 0.0031 0.0005 -0.0001 
Occupation of Household Head:        
Agricultural Self-Employment 0.2291 0.0050 0.2389 0.0053 0.2194 0.0048 0.0195*** 
Page | 31  
 
Variable 
Full Sample Male Female Difference 
Adjusted Wald 
Test 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Agricultural Wage-Employment 0.0824 0.0028 0.0860 0.0030 0.0788 0.0027 0.0072*** 
Non-Agricultural Self-Employment 0.2894 0.0043 0.2984 0.0045 0.2805 0.0041 0.0179*** 
Non-Agricultural Wage-Employment 0.2282 0.0040 0.2275 0.0042 0.2289 0.0040 -0.0014 
No-Earning 0.1710 0.0032 0.1492 0.0030 0.1924 0.0036 -0.0431*** 
Household Socioeconomic Status 
Home Ownership:        
Owns an Accommodation 0.8049 0.0066 0.8061 0.0067 0.8038 0.0065 0.0023 
Pays No Rent 0.1355 0.0060 0.1357 0.0061 0.1352 0.0059 0.0005 
Pays Rent 0.0596 0.0033 0.0582 0.0033 0.0610 0.0033 -0.0028*** 
Net Household Income 6842.25 173.32 5538.84 140.96 8124.44 217.04 -2585.60*** 
Household Asset:        
No Land or Non-Land Asset 0.0108 0.0008 0.0094 0.0008 .0122 0.0009 -0.0028*** 
No Land, Other Asset 0.1247 0.0055 0.1246 0.0056 0.1247 0.0055 -0.0001 
Small Land Owned 0.8076 0.0059 0.8072 0.0060 0.8080 0.0059 -0.0008 
Larger Land Owned 0.0568 0.0030 0.0587 0.0032 0.0550 0.0029 0.0037*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The following was omitted due to multicollinearity: Mymensingh. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Selected Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample Male Female Difference 
Adjusted Wald 
Test Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Monthly Income from Primary Job 13170.71 239.89 13550.46 260.43 12055.22 227.12 1495.24*** 
Personal Characteristics 
Age:        
15-24 0.2182 0.0037 0.2174 0.0040 0.2205 0.0066 -0.0032 
25-34 0.3165 0.0039 0.3086 0.0040 0.3393 0.0063 -0.0307*** 
35-44 0.2398 0.0030 0.2338 0.0033 0.2575 0.0062 -0.0237*** 
45-54 0.1356 0.0026 0.1396 0.0027 0.1242 0.0044 0.0153*** 
55-64 0.0664 0.0017 0.0731 0.0020 0.0469 0.0027 0.0262*** 
65-74 0.0199 0.0008 0.0233 0.0010 0.0101 0.0011 0.0132*** 
75+ 0.0036 0.0003 0.0043 0.0004 0.0014 0.0003 0.0029*** 
Educational Qualification:        
No Education 0.2632 0.0054 0.2425 0.0059 0.3232 0.0084 -0.0807*** 
Below Primary 0.0973 0.0032 0.1007 0.0036 0.0873 0.0046 0.0134*** 
Primary 0.2504 0.0041 0.2532 0.0043 0.2424 0.0065 0.0108* 
Secondary 0.1368 0.0031 0.1377 0.0032 0.1340 0.0051 0.0037 
Higher Secondary 0.1389 0.0034 0.1470 0.0041 0.1154 0.0044 0.0316*** 
Tertiary 0.1085 0.0054 0.1125 0.0054 0.0967 0.0065 0.0158*** 
Others 0.0050 0.0009 0.0064 0.0011 0.0010 0.0004 0.0053*** 
Training 0.0248 0.0018 0.0225 0.0018 0.0315 0.0032 -0.0090*** 
Marital Status:        
Single 0.1958 0.0033 0.2280 0.0039 0.1028 0.0046 0.1252*** 
Married 0.7549 0.0037 0.7613 0.0039 0.7361 0.0071 0.0252*** 
Widowed 0.0319 0.0012 0.0057 0.0005 0.1076 0.0043 -0.1019*** 
Separated/Divorced 0.0174 0.0009 0.0050 0.0004 0.0535 0.0031 -0.0485*** 
Region of Residence 
Residence:        
Urban 0.3988 0.0099 0.3650 0.0091 0.4967 0.0160 -0.1317*** 
Rural 0.6012 0.0099 0.6350 0.0091 0.5033 0.0160 0.1317*** 
Division:        
Barisal 0.0488 0.0037 0.0499 0.0035 0.0456 0.0052 0.0043 
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Variable 
Full Sample Male Female Difference 
Adjusted Wald 
Test Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Chittagong 0.1583 0.0080 0.1526 0.0082 0.1750 0.0113 -0.0224** 
Dhaka 0.3460 0.0123 0.3175 0.0114 0.4284 0.0181 -0.1109*** 
Khulna 0.1004 0.0047 0.1078 0.0052 0.0790 0.0058 0.0288*** 
Rajshahi 0.1166 0.0043 0.1277 0.0045 0.0845 0.0064 0.0432*** 
Rongpur 0.1382 0.0073 0.1509 0.0081 0.1032 0.0073 0.0477*** 
Sylhet 0.0586 0.0038 0.0629 0.0038 0.0470 0.0055 0.0159*** 
Occupation, Sector of Work and Economic Activity 
Occupation/Job Title/Type of Worker (BSCO Major 
Groups): 
       
Armed Forces Occupations 0.0064 0.0014 0.0082 0.0018 0.0012 0.0004 0.0069*** 
Managers 0.0230 0.0015 0.0273 0.0017 0.0103 0.0015 0.0170*** 
Professionals 0.0850 0.0036 0.0709 0.0036 0.1263 0.0063 -0.0554*** 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.0330 0.0013 0.0355 0.0015 0.0260 0.0020 0.0095*** 
Clinical Support Workers 0.0335 0.0016 0.0372 0.0019 0.0225 0.0017 0.0147*** 
Service and Sales Workers 0.1139 0.0030 0.1276 0.0035 0.0736 0.0039 0.0540*** 
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry & Fishery Workers 0.0262 0.0026 0.0289 0.0034 0.0183 0.0018 0.0106*** 
Craft Related Trades Workers 0.2893 0.0074 0.2727 0.0065 0.3383 0.0138 -0.0656*** 
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 0.0839 0.0032 0.0941 0.0036 0.0543 0.0039 0.0398*** 
Elementary Occupations 0.2910 0.0066 0.2805 0.0073 0.3218 0.0106 -0.0414*** 
Private Sector 0.9050 0.0042 0.9091 0.0046 0.8929 0.0056 0.0162*** 
Broad Economic Activity:        
Agriculture 0.1769 0.0066 0.2013 0.0074 0.1051 0.0079 0.0962*** 
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industrial 
activities 
0.4255 0.0089 0.4231 0.0081 0.4324 0.0154 -0.0093 
Construction 0.1175 0.0042 0.1440 0.0051 0.0396 0.0027 0.1044*** 
Service 0.3976 0.0085 0.3755 0.0080 0.4624 0.0145 -0.0869*** 
Written Contract 0.3078 0.0095 0.2942 0.0094 0.3478 0.0130 -0.0536*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The following was omitted due to multicollinearity: Mymensingh. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
Table 5: Mincerian Regression Results from Various Specifications 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 
-
0.1229*** 
(0.0095) 
-
0.1261*** 
(0.0095) 
-
0.0706*** 
(0.0070) 
-
0.0881*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.1141*** 
(0.0056) 
Age  
0.0330*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0118*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0090*** 
(0.0010) 
Age Squared  
-
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
-
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Educational Qualification (ref: No 
Education): 
     
Below Primary   
0.0905*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0842*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0361*** 
(0.0066) 
Primary   
0.1467*** 
(0.0067) 
0.1414*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0439*** 
(0.0054) 
Secondary   
0.2593*** 
(0.0088) 
0.2490*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0727*** 
(0.0072) 
Higher Secondary   
0.5834*** 
(0.0120) 
0.5622*** 
(0.0129) 
0.1691*** 
(0.0088) 
Tertiary   
1.0897*** 
(0.0291) 
1.0631*** 
(0.0288) 
0.3856*** 
(0.0235) 
Others   
0.5193*** 
(0.0552) 
0.5073*** 
(0.0607) 
0.0483 
(0.0366) 
Training   
0.1205*** 
(0.0194) 
0.1036*** 
(0.0204) 
-0.0036 
(0.0187) 
Marital Status (ref: Single):      
Married   
0.0294*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0252*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0180*** 
(0.0056) 
Widowed   
-
0.0640*** 
(0.0134) 
-
0.0536*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0015 
(0.0121) 
Separated/Divorced   
-0.0221 
(0.0170) 
-0.0220 
(0.0176) 
0.0021 
(0.0155) 
Dummy for Urban    
0.0631*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0500*** 
(0.0068) 
Divisional Dummies    Yes Yes 
Occupational Dummies    No Yes 
Dummy for Private Sector    No 
-0.2094*** 
(0.0136) 
Broad Economic Activity 
Dummies 
   No Yes 
Dummy for Written Contract    No 
0.0926*** 
(0.0076) 
Constant 
9.3581*** 
(0.0099) 
8.7178*** 
(0.0268) 
8.7681*** 
(0.0192) 
8.7928*** 
(0.0210) 
9.9317*** 
(0.0471) 
No. of Observations 69,219 69,219 69,219 60,986 60,976 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.0113 0.0428 0.4991 0.5117 0.6555 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The following were omitted due to multicollinearity: Mymensingh and 
Rajshahi. 
Source: Author’s own calculation (up to 4 d.p.). 
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Table 6: Results Using Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Panel A: Overall 
Male 9.3657*** (0.0098) 
Female 9.2401*** (0.0109) 
Difference 0.1255*** (0.0098) 
Explained 0.0094 (0.0084) 
Unexplained 0.1161*** (0.0056) 
Panel B: Explained 
Age 0.0149*** (0.0025) 
Age Squared -0.0130*** (0.0023) 
Education 0.0145*** (0.0020) 
Training 0.0000 (0.0001) 
Marital Status 0.0004 (0.0015) 
Urban -0.0061*** (0.0011) 
Division -0.0103*** (0.0015) 
Occupation 0.0120** (0.0053) 
Private Sector -0.0028** (0.0013) 
Broad Economic Activity 0.0047*** (0.0014) 
Written Contract -0.0045*** (0.0011) 
Unexplained 
Age 0.1822*** (0.0617) 
Age Squared -0.0904*** (0.0287) 
Education 0.0321 (0.1505) 
Training -0.0013 (0.0008) 
Marital Status 0.0351 (0.0298) 
Urban -0.0071 (0.0048) 
Division 0.0884*** (0.0184) 
Occupation 0.1893*** (0.0625) 
Private Sector -0.1170*** (0.0160) 
Broad Economic Activity -0.0341*** (0.0109) 
Written Contract 0.0089** (0.0039) 
Constant -0.1701 (0.1709) 
Number of Observations 61,688 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s own calculation (up to 4 d.p.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Quantile Regression Results 
Variable Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90 
Female 
-0.1427*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.1343*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.1249*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.1151*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.1047*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.1022*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.1123*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.1241*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.1212*** 
(0.0068) 
Age 
0.0064*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0073*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0083*** 
(0.0013) 
Age Squared 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Educational Qualification (ref: No 
Education): 
         
Below Primary 
0.0436*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0340*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0368*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0250*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0364*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0257*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0250*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0257*** 
(0.0068) 
Primary 
0.0488*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0434*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0444*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0378*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0417*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0370*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0381*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0257*** 
(0.0067) 
Secondary 
0.0504*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0514*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0626*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0665*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0748*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0814*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0766*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0783*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0636*** 
(0.0075) 
Higher Secondary 
0.1164*** 
(0.0079) 
0.1183*** 
(0.0068) 
0.1278*** 
(0.0072) 
0.1409*** 
(0.0079) 
0.1698*** 
(0.0072) 
0.1875*** 
(0.0074) 
0.2005*** 
(0.0080) 
0.1966*** 
(0.0074) 
0.1755*** 
(0.0091) 
Tertiary 
0.2750*** 
(0.0099) 
0.2917*** 
(0.0114) 
0.3063*** 
(0.0097) 
0.3143*** 
(0.0102) 
0.3377*** 
(0.0098) 
0.3444*** 
(0.0103) 
0.3640*** 
(0.0129) 
0.4192*** 
(0.0132) 
0.4871*** 
(0.0169) 
Others 
0.0013 
(0.0522) 
0.0136 
(0.0214) 
-0.0034 
(0.0366) 
0.0002 
(0.0163) 
0.0255 
(0.0424) 
0.0670*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0636 
(0.0564) 
0.1050*** 
(0.0363) 
0.1037*** 
(0.0122) 
Training 
0.0621*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0338** 
(0.0143) 
0.0200*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0007 
(0.0094) 
-0.0109 
(0.0116) 
-0.0132 
(0.0124) 
-0.0064 
(0.0136) 
-0.0328* 
(0.0179) 
-0.0438** 
(0.0219) 
Marital Status (ref: Single):          
Married 
0.0239*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0295*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0244*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0142** 
(0.0055) 
0.0124** 
(0.0056) 
0.0242*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0101 
(0.0074) 
-0.0148* 
(0.0083) 
Widowed 
-0.0426*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0050 
(0.0098) 
0.0036 
(0.0099) 
0.0017 
(0.0113) 
0.0095 
(0.0146) 
0.0154 
(0.0120) 
0.0197* 
(0.0108) 
0.0149 
(0.0131) 
-0.0059 
(0.0135) 
Separated/Divorced 
-0.0206 
(0.0134) 
0.0015 
(0.0087) 
-0.0056 
(0.0141) 
-0.0042 
(0.0090) 
-0.0057 
(0.0144) 
0.0065 
(0.0165) 
0.0165 
(0.0133) 
0.0106 
(0.0251) 
0.0089 
(0.0141) 
Dummy for Urban 
0.0273*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0275*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0294*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0301*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0369*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0537*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0609*** 
(0.0052) 
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Variable Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90 
Divisional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for Private Sector 
-0.1667*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.1639*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.1782*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.1979*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.2092*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.2247*** 
(0.0080) 
-0.2222*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.2229*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.2207*** 
(0.0067) 
Broad Economic Activity 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for Written Contract 
0.0633*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0809*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0852*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0850*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0817*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0830*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0905*** 
(0.0057) 
0.1041*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0991*** 
(0.0063) 
Constant 
9.6125*** 
(0.0206) 
9.6957*** 
(0.0225) 
9.7573*** 
(0.0223) 
9.8366*** 
(0.0205) 
9.8716*** 
(0.0243) 
9.9036*** 
(0.0231) 
9.9876*** 
(0.0309) 
10.1542**
* 
(0.0303) 
10.4638**
* 
(0.0327) 
No. of Observations 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 60,976 
Pseudo R2 0.2597 0.3044 0.3357 0.3637 0.3845 0.4244 0.4619 0.4867 0.4938 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The following were omitted due to multicollinearity: Mymensingh and Rajshahi. 
Source: Author’s own calculation (up to 4 d.p.). 
Table 8: Results Using Quantile Counterfactual Decomposition 
Quantile 
Observed 
Wage Gap 
Percentage 
Gap 
Characteristics 
Effect 
Coefficients 
Effect 
Proportion Due 
to Discrimination 
0.10 0.1625 17.6448 -0.0104 0.1730 1.0646 
0.20 0.1208 12.8399 -0.0148 0.1357 1.1233 
0.30 0.1128 11.9408 -0.0134 0.1261 1.1179 
0.40 0.1158 12.2771 -0.0098 0.1256 1.0846 
0.50 0.1059 11.1711 -0.0059 0.1117 1.0548 
0.60 0.1155 12.2435 0.0035 0.1120 0.9697 
0.70 0.1444 15.5346 0.0246 0.1198 0.8296 
0.80 0.1060 11.1822 0.0339 0.0720 0.6792 
0.90 0.0747 7.7561 0.0135 0.0612 0.8193 
OB 0.1255 13.3715 0.0094 0.1161 0.9251 
Notes: QCD results differ from QR ones due to the incorporation of the counterfactual. Percentage gap 
calculated as [(exp(Observed Wage Gap)-1)*100] (Ahmed and Maitra, 2011). 
Source: Author’s own calculation (up to 4 d.p.). 
 
 
 
